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bermas’s version of constitutional patriotism, which Müller otherwise treats as
exemplary. The protective measures mentioned by Habermas are closer to the
constitutional measures and responses of civil society (e.g., demonstrations and
boycotts) that Müller later discusses (114–15). Here too he sets out the problems
without claiming any definitive resolution of them.
These relatively minor disagreements with Müller’s account of the history
and theory of constitutional patriotism in no way detract from its considerable
merits. If not the last thing anyone interested in this approach to political
allegiance in a globalizing, postnationalist world should read, it might well be
the first.
Thomas McCarthy
Yale University

Nussbaum, Martha C. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 2006. Pp. 487. $35.00
(cloth); $18.95 (paper).
For two decades Martha Nussbaum has refined her version of a capabilities
approach in ethics, first, as a thick vague conception of the good on which to
anchor a nonrelative Aristotelian ethics of virtue and, later, as a superordinate
substantive conception of the good to serve as a platform for an outcomecentered theory of justice, especially with regard to sex equality. In Frontiers of
Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership Nussbaum squarely lays down her
marker on the terrain of contemporary Anglo-American justice theory, placing
her own view in direct but respectful competition, indeed in extended pointby-point parallel, with that of John Rawls. Along the way and more incidentally,
Nussbaum draws comparisons with the views of Amartya Sen, Brian Barry,
Thomas Scanlon, Eva Kittay, Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, Onora O’Neill, and
Peter Singer. The book is grand in conception and complex in construction. It
is both a major contribution to twenty-first-century post-Rawlsian theory of justice
and a persuasive analysis of the limits and possibilities that modern Western
philosophy has bequeathed to the project of justice theory generally. As both a
treatise and a historically situated assessment of the field, the book might (and
certainly should) be reviewed along a number of different dimensions that beg
close examination. There is a sustained and detailed critique of Rawls’s theory
of justice (although the book is dedicated to his memory and the radical critique
is hedged by repeated homage to Rawls’s “brave and fascinating approach”
[406]). There is an instructive and useful critique of modern contractarian
thought or at least of some strands in that tradition that have affinities with
Rawls’s theory. There is the renewed and more integrated presentation of Nussbaum’s own capabilities-based (partial) theory of justice, which she describes as
another member of the family of politically liberal conceptions of justice (6).
Finally, there are those “frontiers” of the book’s title: the topics of justice to
human beings significantly impaired physically or mentally; justice among human beings around the world and across national boundaries; and justice, if
that is indeed the relevant moral category, as Nussbaum claims, to nonhuman
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animals. I shall focus on Nussbaum’s powerful constructive contribution to the
field: her defense of the capabilities approach as a politically liberal conception
of justice and her sallies beyond the frontiers that limit Rawls’s (and some other)
theory. This still leaves too much to address in detail, for the ethical vision is
unified but the style is dialectical, a rapid progression of arguments that thrust
and parry with Rawls’s position, with the views of other philosophers, and with
anticipated objections and alternatives.
The first one hundred pages cut a path to the frontiers. The path leads us
through a diagnosis and critique of component assumptions of the social contract tradition, or more precisely, assumptions in some parts of that tradition,
as well as in contemporaneous modern political philosophy, that converge in
Rawls’s theory, the “strongest and most convincing theory in the tradition” (57).
There are four key assumptions: first, a Humean understanding of the circumstances of justice in which roughly equal parties seek to satisfy similar interests
under conditions of moderate scarcity and limited benevolence or mutual disinterest; second, the parties to the contract are assumed to be free, equal, and
independent in ways that bypass or rule out profoundly unequal capacities,
asymmetrical dependencies, and essentially shared interests; third, parties contract in order to secure benefits unavailable without social cooperation, without
regard for justice or for others’ interests for their own sakes; and fourth, the
parties are parsimoniously assumed to be moved by their own prospective advantage, conceived egoistically or not.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach confronts the Rawlsian-contractarian
model point for point. First, the “Aristotelian-Marxian” conception of human
beings is inherently sociable and political; we are fulfilled by relations with others
and moved by “relations characterized by the virtue of justice,” however understood (86). We do not require roughly equal power or the strains of scarcity to
have interests in justice; rather, large asymmetries of power among human beings, or among human and other active beings, “might make questions of justice
more urgent,” and in any case “questions of justice are always on the table”
concerning goods centrally involved in living well with others (87). Second, a
“political conception of the person” insists that a human being has an animal
body, with material needs and a temporal trajectory entailing asymmetrical dependencies at many times or throughout a life, and a political nature in which
shared interests are central. Third, social cooperation is not an objective to
which principles and relations of justice are merely instrumental; justice is “one
thing human beings love and pursue” as an end (89). Finally, the inherently
sociable parties to principles of justice are moved by concern for others’ interests
and by sympathy and compassion that are capable, and needful, of wide extension (91). Nussbaum thus rejects on each constitutive element “society as a
contract for mutual advantage . . . among people who are ‘free, equal, and
independent’” (14); she indicts contractarian theories for conflating those by
whom the contract is designed with those for whom basic principles must provide
just arrangements (16).
Rawls himself, as Nussbaum repeatedly says, recognized the three frontier
issues as “unsolved problems” (ix). In later chapters, Nussbaum, in great detail
I cannot summarize here, argues that these admittedly unsolved problems cannot be solved, or can be addressed only inadequately, within the constraining
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contractarian assumptions she identifies. The constructive argument of the book
is that her own capabilities approach suggests “insights superior to those suggested, for those particular problems, by the social contract tradition” (5). Nussbaum, in a consistently modest and undogmatic tone, demurs from claiming
that the capabilities approach to justice is “better overall” (6) and offers her
view as an alternative within the family of liberal political conceptions of justice
that are committed to wide scope for individual freedom and egalitarian commitment to securing well-being, including robust freedoms, for each and every
human individual.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is by now familiar to many from her
previous work. The presentation in Frontiers is not so much deepened or nuanced
as it is slightly elaborated. Nussbaum provides a list of central human capabilities
that provide the “relevant benchmark to use in asking whether a given society
has delivered a minimal level of justice to its citizens” (74). Capabilities involve
both abilities and opportunities, especially for activity and choice, in ten fundamental areas of human existence: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; sense,
imagination, and thought; emotions and attachments; practical reasoning; affiliation with others (encompassing the social bases of self-respect); relation to
other nonhuman beings and nature; play; and political and material control
over one’s environment (76–78). A capabilities-based approach to justice requires that societies achieve a threshold level of each and every capability for
each and every individual, treating each as an end and none as a mere means
to the ends of others (70). Achievement of the threshold is a “core human
entitlement that should be respected and implemented by the governments of
all nations” (70). The capabilities approach is “only a partial and minimal account of justice” that does not, for example, address inequalities above the
minimal threshold (71).
Rawlsian political liberalism reenters Nussbaum’s account in her justificatory appeal to the possibility of “an overlapping consensus among people who
otherwise have very different conceptions of the good” on the requirements of
“a life worthy of human dignity” for any individual and on the entitlement of
each and every person to such a life (70). Her appeal to human dignity is more
integrated than in previous work by the claim that dignity is not to be understood
independently of or prior to capabilities; instead, the capabilities constitute, at
least in part, a dignified life (162). These “deep moral intuitions and considered
judgments about human dignity do play a fundamental role in the theory, although they are never immune from criticism in the light of other elements of
the theory” (83). In her discussion of transnational justice, Nussbaum argues
that this rich and completely egalitarian “freestanding reflective intuition” is a
viable object of overlapping consensus not only in a society such as ours but in
the world community, claiming that “the idea of what human beings need for
fully human living is among the most vivid intuitive ideas we share” (279). She
disapproves of Rawls’s situated justification of his political conception of justice
in the overlapping consensus available in a society with a particular history of
religious conflict and tradition of liberal democratic constitutionalism. Nussbaum finds this insufficiently ambitious; there is hope for the relevant consensus
in “any nation living under modern conditions in a world characterized by a
world culture of human rights” (304). I believe that this concedes the deeper
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point that such consensus is a hard-won historical achievement, as such ideas
“have gradually taken center stage” (305) and continue to reshape what is “implicit” in the idea of human dignity (and the fundamental moral equality she
takes to be part of that notion). In the same discussion, Nussbaum concedes
that “equality of capability is an essential social goal where its absence would be
connected with a deficit in dignity and self-respect” (292) but that equality is
not a reasonable goal with regard to all central capabilities and that, for some
capabilities, adequacy suffices (295); she places political liberty in the former
category, shelter and property in the latter, and education and health as requiring a “very high minimum,” if not strict equality (294). It seems that the
implicit content of the idea of a life worthy of dignity is not simply intuitive or
freestanding; it is a function of progressive interpretation informed and limited
by the historical influence and confluence of particular religious, ethical, social,
and legal cultures in the context of transformations that may have nothing to
do with political or philosophical thought.
What, now, of the frontier issues that occupy such a large part of this book?
The chapters dealing with disability, nationality, and relations with nonhuman
animals are densely packed and vibrant with bold ideas. A tremendous strength
of Frontiers is Nussbaum’s unabashed forcing and eventual outrunning of anything one might claim to be “intuitive” on these matters; this is what we need
normative theory to do. In chapters 2 and 3 on people with severe impairments,
Nussbaum rejects the contractarian account that entitles “fully cooperating members of society” to the mutual advantages of cooperation (98) and the Kantian
conception of persons that disowns human animality (132). She proposes a
“moralized conception of the benefits of social cooperation . . . that includes
the good of inclusion, respect for human dignity, and justice itself among the
benefits” (121); this conception, she acknowledges, requires “extensive and
deep” benevolence of human beings (122). The capabilities approach insists on
the entitlement of each and every citizen to threshold achievement of every
capability he or she could attain, and Nussbaum reaps the benefits of a literature
on disability that makes clear that many disabling conditions, including ones
thought “severe,” involve recalcitrant but transformable physical and social environments. The relevant question is “has the public political arrangement in
which she lives extended to her the social basis of all the capabilities on the list?
If so, then the public conception has done its job, even if her own impairments
may prevent a full choice of functioning in one or more areas” (193–94; Nussbaum’s emphasis). Where “direct empowerment” is not possible, societies should
resort to generous and humane arrangements of guardianship that are currently
far more advanced in a number of affluent societies than they are in the United
States (195–210).
Chapter 4 is devoted almost entirely to a discussion of the failure of Rawls’s
conception of international justice in The Law of Peoples, while chapter 5 argues
that “human development and human global fellowship” must supplant the
contractarian idea of justice as an arrangement for mutual advantage of roughly
equal actors (323). Rawls’s own two-stage approach to international justice as
justice among peoples is criticized for accepting, indeed affirming through misplaced tolerance, the status quo of staggering global inequalities among states
and unacceptable political inequalities within them. Rejecting Onora O’Neill’s
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argument for the priority of duty to entitlement, Nussbaum argues that we need
an account of “what treatment human dignity requires from the world” prior
to solving the problem of who bears the corresponding duties (277). Like
O’Neill, however, Nussbaum believes those duty bearers will include governmental and nongovernmental agents, with primary responsibility assigned to
institutions (307–8). She enumerates without elaboration ten principles for a
“thin and decentralized” (314) and multiply redundant global structure of responsibilities (315–24). Nussbaum’s stance on intervention is unclear; drawing
on Grotius, she champions a moral presumption in favor of the state as “a key
focus for persons’ exercise of their freedom” (257), at least where the state rises
to some bar of “reasonable accountability” to its citizens (259).
In the final lengthy and difficult chapter, Nussbaum argues that her capabilities approach treats at least sentient animals as agents and subjects of
justice, creatures “to whom something is due” (337). I was not convinced that
the many parts of this discussion added up to a consistent whole. Animal entitlements, like human ones, are determined by a “species-norm” of what counts
as flourishing, a dignified life, for a particular kind of animal (365). Nussbaum
denies that any natural form of life is intrinsically more worthy than another,
although sentience is a condition for entitlements (361). She holds that we
ought not to “aggregate the good of lives or types of lives” (351); the subject
of justice is the individual animal (357). Yet she argues that research on animals
for medical advantages to humans and other animals is at least sometimes permissible, if “tragic” (402–3), and that sterilization or extermination of animals
as complex as rats in the interests of humans might be acceptable if pain is
avoided (387). While part of the flourishing of a complex animal is “to settle
certain very important matters on its own” (373), she advocates intervention
even in the wild to divert predators from causing pain to prey and to prevent
assaults on infant, sick, disabled, or elderly animals (399), and she approves
“careful use of zoos and animals parks” to build interspecies “friendship”
(375–76). Nussbaum’s vision for interspecies relations begins with the Aristotelian idea that it is good for a being “to persist and flourish as the kind of thing
it is” (349) and ends in a call for “the gradual supplanting of the natural by the
just” (400). I welcomed Nussbaum’s exploration of the morally foundational
proposition that human beings flourish as a kind in part through their need
for and love of justice and of others (11, 156–57). I found unsettling some
implications of Nussbaum’s “paternalistic” approach to the lives of other animals
(375).
Margaret Urban Walker
Arizona State University

Richardson, Henry S. Democratic Autonomy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. 316. $29.95 (paper).
Perhaps too much has been made of the grand poetic moments of political
action—the foundings and revolutions—and not enough of the more prosaic
details of governance that, on aggregate, bear much more heavily on the quo-

